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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
One third of the world food production is governed by cooperatives (Pattison, 2000). 
This observation raises two questions. First, it is important to know whether or not the 
governance structure cooperative produces food in an efficient way. Second, it is interesting to 
know why not all food is produced in agricultural cooperatives.  
This article provides an empirical start to addressing the first question by comparing 
the diversification behavior of agricultural cooperatives and stock listed companies. The 
coexistence of both governance structures in many industries provides several possibilities for 
such a comparison. The implications of the choice of governance structure for diversification 
strategy will be empirically investigated in three sectors (food, trade and financial services) in 
the Netherlands. Hendrikse (1998) presents evidence and an explanation for the coexistence of  
cooperatives and stock listed companies in most agricultural and horticultural sectors. 
A governance structure specifies on the one hand who formally holds the decisions 
rights and on the other hand the way in which revenues and costs are (Hansmann, 1996). 
Governance structures can be distinguished by the identity of the owner of the decision rights. 
The providers capital, or shareholders, are the owners of the enterprise in a stock listed 
company. The input providers have the formal authority regarding decisions in a marketing 
cooperative, of which agricultural – and horticultural cooperatives are prominent examples. 
Employees have the formal authority regarding decisions in a labor managed firm, whereas 
buyers have these rights in buying cooperatives.   
Product diversification entails the entry of the company into new industries. A 
company is viewed as diversified when it is active active in more than one industry at the 
same time (Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). Usually the distinction is made between related and 
unrelated diversification (Van Oijen, 1997). Related diversification entails the entry of a 
company into an industry which is related to the current activities of the company in its value 
chain (Porter, 1985). The similarities are usually in production, marketing of technology. 
Unrelated diversification, or conglomeration, entails the entry into an industry which has no 
significant relationship with current activities. 
Lins en Servaes (1999) have shown empirically a relationship between the effect of 
diversification policy on the value of the company and the institutional structure of a country. 
The institutional structure of a country is measured by the concentration of property rights and 
the structure of industrial groups. They conclude that ‘evidence supports the notion that 
differences in corporate governance matter’ (p. 2237). Kamshad (1994) did not find an 
empirical signicant difference between the diversification strategy of stock listed companies 
and labor managed firms in France. This article article compares the diversification policy of 
marketing cooperatives and stock listed companies in the Netherlands.  
The structure of this article is as follows. The next section formulates the hypotheses 
regarding the difference in diversification behavior of cooperatives and stock listed 
companies. The next two sections are dedicated to the methodology of our empirical work and 
the results of the empirical investigation. We close with a summary and conclusion. 
 
 
2 THEORY EN HYPOTHESES 
 
Literature that directly links cooperatives to product diversification is not available. 
However, clues might be found in existing perspectives on diversification. Five perspectives 
that explain diversification can be distinguished (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Montgomery, 
1994). Each perspective is rooted in a different theory. According to the market power 
perspective, which is rooted in Industrial Organization, firms diversify because diversification 
enables them to exert market power through mechanisms like, for example, cross-
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subsidization and predatory pricing (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). The next 
perspective, which is based on agency theory, argues that firms diversify because their 
managers have personal motives to do so. Managers do not return free cash flows to the 
shareholders, but spend them on diversification projects, because of motives such as empire 
building, pay increases, and reduction of employment risk (Jensen, 1986). The third 
perspective is based on the strategic contingency theory (Venkatraman, 1989). Product 
diversification is then seen as a response to contingencies like antitrust law and bad results and 
uncertainty in the traditional activities of the firm. According to the next perspective, which is 
rooted in the resource-based view, firms can have excess resources (Penrose, 1959). The 
resources can be redeployed in new businesses, which implies diversification. Finally, firms 
diversify to achieve benefits, like economies of scope (Teece, 1982) and those of the internal 
capital market (Williamson, 1975), which are difficult to realize through market transactions 
because of high transaction casts.  
The five main explanations regarding diversification provide only limited guidance with 
respect to the relationship between diversification and governance structure. Governance 
structure could of course be added as an additional contingency to the strategic contingency 
theory of Venkatraman (1989). This entails however that a theory has to be developed that 
explains how and why the different governance structures direct diversification strategy. This 
section provides an attempt at the formulation of such a theory. 
The shareholders or the providers of equity can be considered as the owners of the 
enterprise in a stock listed company. They have the formal decision rights regarding new 
investments and the inputs which are used. The farmers decide about these issues in a 
marketing cooperative. This entails usually that each member of a marketing cooperative owns 
assets in, and therefore decides about, two stages of the production chain. The farmer decides 
individually about the investments at his farm and owns the farm assets. On top that do all 
farmers collectively own the assets in the next stage of the production chain, which are 
dedicated to processing the harvest or produce of the farm. An agricultural or horticultural 
cooperative boils therefore down to forward integration of many farmers collectively in the 
processing stage of the production chain. 
The difference between the governance structures stock listed company and marketing 
cooperative is noticeable in many aspects of these organizations (Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002 
and Hendrikse and Veerman, 1997, 2001a and 2001b). The members of a marketing 
cooperative are collectively the owner, take care of the financing of the cooperative, decide 
democratically and buy inputs from the members. The shareholders of a stock listed company 
are individual owners, they have provided the external equity, the decision making is 
autocratic and inputs are bought from the best provider of inputs.  
A number of aspects of democratic decision making will be addressed briefly, which is 
based on Hendrikse en Veerman (2001a). Democratic decision making usually entails that it is 
tried to establish consensus in order foster optimal involvement of the members. This has 
advantages as well as disadvantages. It is attractive that different perspectives and experiences 
can be combined in the decision making process and makes it less sensitive to political 
activities, because bad proposals won’t survive. An important disadvantage is the time 
consuming process of decision making and forming consensus regarding important policy 
shifts, especially when the relationship with the input activities of the marketing, and therefore 
with the core activities of the members, is hard to make.  
The democratic decision making structure in marketing cooperatives is not only time 
consuming, but can also result in a tendency to avoid new initiatives. The reason is that new 
initiatives do not hane the same consequences for all members. The lack of homogeneity 
between the members may prevent that unanimity between the members will not be reached. 
New initiatives may also be frustrated by the way a marketing cooperative is financed. Take-
overs cannot be financed by external equity. Equity has to be generated internally. This has its 
own problems due to the finite duration of membership. Earnings during the membership have 
05/23/02 page 3 out of 10 
to be at least as high as earnings elsewhere. This implies that the internal ‘rate of return’ on 
the assets of a cooperative have to be at least as high as in a stock-listed company when the 
average duration of the membership is shorter than the pay back period of the project creates 
problems. This is the well known horizon problem (Bonin, Jones en Putterman, 1993). The 
increasing average age of the members in marketing cooperatives exaberates this problem. 
Marketing cooperatives which are mainly financed internally will therefore underinvest 
compared to stock-listed companies when the claims of individual members are not 
transferable. This effect will be enhanced by the terms on which financial funds will be made 
available by third parties. The property of member domination in a marketing cooperative 
entails that the decision rights of external equity providers has to be bought. This is not done 
in a stock-listed company. The assignment of decision rights regarding investment projects to 
shareholders gives shareholders the confidence that their financial means will be spend well. 
These differences between these the governance structures marketing cooperative and 
stock-listed company indicate that marketing cooperatives will invest less than stock-listed 
companies, related as well as unrelated. These conclusions are formulated in the next two 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Stock listed companies are more diversified in related activities than 
marketing cooperatives. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Stock-listed companies are more diversified in unrelated activities than 
marketing cooperatives. 
 
Consensus decision making in marketing cooperatives will be easier when the members are 
more homogeneous. Marketing cooperatives which are focussing on one activity, like milk, 
have homogeneous members. Diversification can undermine this homogeneity. A marketing 
cooperative which starts to sell vegetables in cans next to its dairy products has two different 
types of suppliers. The fair allocation of the revenues may be difficult. The relatedness 
between certain activities may make it desirable to bundle certain functions. For example, 
marketing and logistics can be combined to a certain extend in order to save costs. A simple 
allocation rule for the division of revenues, like the number of delivered liters of a certain 
quality, cannot be used anymore. Difficult negotiations between the different types of 
members will be the result. The addition of an unrelated activity, like the sale of insurance 
products, diminishes this problem. There will be less combined functions. Each activity has its 
own revenues, which can be relatively easy be divided across the different types of members.     
Related diversification causes less problems in stock-listed companies. The 
shareholders are homogeneous, in the sense that that they provide the same type of means. 
Profits can be shared according to the funds that have been provided. Another feature is that 
shareholders can diversify their risk easy by keeping a portfolio of stocks. The wealth of a 
member of a marketing cooperative is determined to a large extend by the well being of the 
marketing cooperative. They benefit therefore from a marketing cooperative investing in 
activities whose returns hardly correlate, which entails spreading of risks. Unrelated 
diversification establishes this. The expectation is therefore that, in comparison to a stock 
listed company, a marketing cooperative diversifies relatively more in unrelated than related 
activities. This is summarized in our third hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Marketing cooperatives diversify relatively more in unrelated than 
related diversification than stock listed companies. 
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3 METHODS 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The data were obtained from REACH (REview and Analysis of Companies in Holland). 
REACH is an electronic data source, which contains information of many Dutch companies. 
The information is predominantly financial. Important for our study is that the legal structure, 
the industry codes, and a brief description of the activities of each company are also provided.1 
All cooperatives that were recorded in the 1996 edition of REACH were included in the 
sample. For each cooperative, we established the industry code of the main activity. This was 
based on the industry codes and the description of the activities of the cooperative included in 
REACH. Subsequently, we selected a matching corporation with the same main activity. This 
approach allowed us to control for industry effects. If more corporations were available, we 
selected one corporation randomly. 
The resulting sample contains 114 companies, of which 57 are cooperatives and 57 are 
corporations. The companies can be assigned to three sectors or broad categories of activities: 
agricultural and food (58 companies), financial services (34 companies), and wholesale and 
retail (16 companies). Besides, there is a small category of companies with other activities (6 
companies). 
 
3.2 Measures 
 
3.2.1 Diversification strategy 
 
To measure diversification strategy we used Wood’s (1971) product-count measures. 
These unweighted measures are less refined than, for example, the entropy measures 
(Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). However, they are easy to calculate and have lower information 
requirements (Lubatkin, Merchant, and Srinivasin, 1993). Specifically, they do not require a 
breakdown of a firm’s total sales by activity codes. This kind of breakdown would not have 
been feasible in our study, because most of the companies in our sample do not disclose the 
necessary information. Moreover, Lubatkin et al. (1993) find a high degree of correspondence 
between Wood’s product-count measures and Rumelt’s (1974) categorical measure, which 
supports the validity of the product-count measures. 
Wood (1971) distinguishes broad spectrum diversification (BSD) and narrow spectrum 
diversification (NSD). BSD is expansion, other than vertical integration, into an industry with 
different first two digits of the industry code. NSD is expansion, other than vertical 
integration, into an industry with a different four-digit industry code, but the same first two 
digits. BSD can be viewed as unrelated diversification, whereas NSD represents related 
diversification (Varadarajan and Ramanujam, 1987). We calculated both BSD and NSD, using 
the industry codes of each company according to REACH. To improve the distributional 
characteristics, we used the log of BSD and NSD in the analysis, thus obtaining the variables 
LOGBSD and LOGNSD. 
In order to test our third hypothesis, we needed a variable that expresses the relation 
between related and unrelated diversification. We used a variant of MNSD, which was 
introduced by Varadarajan and Ramanujam (1987). MNSD, which stands for mean narrow 
spectrum diversification, is calculated as the number of four-digit industry codes divided by 
the number of two-digit industry codes of a company. In order to convey the relation between 
related and unrelated diversification, we replaced the numerator by NSD (our measure of 
                                                   
1 The industry codes are based on the BIK system. BIK, which stands for BedrijfsIndeling Kamers van 
Koophandel (Company Classification Chambers of Commerce), is the Dutch equivalent of the American SIC. 
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related diversification). Again, we took the log of the outcome to get a better approximation of 
the normal distribution. The resulting variable is labeled LOGMNSD. 
 
3.2.2 Legal structure 
 
For a company’s governance structure or legal structure we used the dichotomous 
variable LEGALS. LEGALS has a value of 0 for cooperatives, and a value of 1 for 
corporations. 
 
3.2.3 Size 
 
Controlling for size is quite common in diversification studies (Chatterjee and 
Wernerfelt, 1991). A positive correlation can be expected between size and diversification. 
Also, corporations may generally be larger than cooperatives. As indicated earlier, 
corporations face fewer restrictions with respect to the funding of expansion. They can finance 
expansion through the public offering of new shares in the stock market, whereas cooperatives 
are restricted to obtaining new equity from their members. If we would not control for size, 
then differences between the diversification strategies of corporations and cooperatives could 
be associated with size differences, instead of legal structure. 
Usually, the total sales of a firm are taken as a proxy of size (Nayyar, 1993). We also 
choose total company sales. To obtain a more normal distribution, we used LOGSALES, the 
log of sales. 
 
3.2.4 Statistical analysis 
 
We used analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to test the hypotheses. Three analyses were 
performed, one with LOGBSD as the dependent variable, one with LOGNSD as the dependent 
variable, and one with LOGMNSD as the dependent variable. In all three cases, the factor was 
LEGALS, and the covariate was LOGSALES. The inclusion of LOGSALES as a covariate is 
equivalent to testing whether the mean differences in diversification strategy are associated 
with the legal structure after adjusting for differences in size. 
 
4 RESULTS 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that cooperatives would have less related diversification than 
corporations. Hypothesis 2 predicted the same, but then for unrelated diversification. 
According to hypothesis 3, the ratio of related to unrelated diversification is lower for 
cooperatives than it is for corporations. 
Table 1 shows the results obtained when all three hypotheses are tested by comparing 
cooperatives to corporations, while controlling for size. We excluded one corporation from the 
analyses, because it proved to be an outlier with respect to both size and diversification 
strategy. Table 1 also provides some descriptive statistics. It should be noted that the group 
means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are not based on the transformed variables 
LOGBSD, LOGNSD, and LOGMNSD, but on the original variables, since these are easier to 
interpret. 
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 LOGBSD LOGNSD LOGMNSD 
 F p F P F p 
Factor for legal structure: 
LEGALS 
 
19.08 
 
0.00 
 
8.90 
 
0.00 
 
0.04 
 
0.84 
Covariate for size: 
LOGSALES 
 
0.08 
 
0.77 
 
13.81 
 
0.00 
 
9.06 
 
0.00 
       
Group mean (standard 
deviation) 
      
Cooperatives (N = 57) 1.28 (0.53) 1.81 (1.33) 1.44 (0.88) 
Corporations (N = 56) 1.91 (0.98) 2.79 (1.90) 1.87 (1.67) 
 
Table 1. ANCOVA results 
 
The results indicate that size (LOGSALES) has a significant (positive) effect on related 
diversification (LOGNSD) and on the relation between related and unrelated diversification 
(LOGMNSD), but not on unrelated diversification (LOGBSD). The effect of the legal 
structure (LEGALS) is highly significant, on both related and unrelated diversification. The 
means show that, on average, corporations are active in 1.49 times as many unrelated 
industries as cooperatives are. The difference is slightly larger for related diversification. 
Corporations work in 1.54 times as many related industries as cooperatives do. Therefore, 
corporations turn out to be more diversified, both related and unrelated, than cooperatives. 
This supports our first two hypotheses. 
We can add that the results are stable in all sectors. That is, in agricultural and food, 
financial services, wholesale and retail, and other activities, corporations are, on average, more 
diversified than cooperatives, both in a related and in an unrelated sense. 
The means seem to support our third hypothesis. Cooperatives have a lower ratio of 
related to unrelated diversification than corporations. However, the difference is not 
statistically significant. This pattern repeats itself in three out of four sectors. In financial 
services, the ratio is almost similar.  
 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This article has empirically investigated the relationship between governance structure 
and diversification. Hypotheses are developed regarding the difference in diversification 
behavior between marketing cooperatives and stock listed companies. Testing of these 
hypotheses was done with a cross section study of 114 Dutch cooperatives and stock listed 
companies. The results indicate that stock listed companies are more diversified than marketing 
cooperatives, related as well as unrelated. These results hold for each sector that we have 
investigated. 
Our results indicate thet the incorporation of the variable governance structure in 
diversification research seems to be a fruitful direction for further research. A few lines of 
research come up immediately. First, the relationship between related and unrelated 
diversification in each governance structure is not clear. The impression is that marketing 
cooperatives diversify more in unrelated than related activities than stock listed companies. 
However, this difference could not be shown in a statistically significant way with the current 
sample.  
Second, the above results do not necessarily imply that marketing cooperatives are less 
efficient/profitable than stock listed companies. We established that there is a significant 
difference between the diversification behavior of marketing cooperatives and stock listed 
05/23/02 page 7 out of 10 
companies, but the relationship with efficiency is less clear. The meta-study of Palich, Cardinal 
en Miller (2000) reports an inverse U relationship between diversification and profitability. The 
‘horizon problem’ may imply that marketing cooperatives will use a higher return on 
investment for new activities / projects than stock listed companies. The diversification strategy 
of the marketing cooperative would therefore be more in the middle of the inverse U 
relationship than the stock listed company. However, the ‘horizon problem’ may also result in 
not adopting certain attractive activities because it will take a long time before these projects 
generate money. Besides, the marketing cooperative may also adopt projects which are less 
efficient, because the members take also farm considerations into account. The impression is 
that these latter effects dominate. The data to test these hypotheses is not available.  
A third direction for further research is that the implicit assumption in the specification 
of the regression equations that the governance structure is the exogenous variable and the 
diversification strategy the endogenous variable. This is in line with the incomplete contracting 
theory and transaction costs economics, where the choice of governance structure precedes the 
choice of investment projects. However, diversification policy may be determinative for the 
choice of governance structure. This would be in line with the result ‘Form follows function’ in  
evolutionary biology (Cosmides en Tooby, 1994) and the claim of Chandler (1962) ‘structure 
follows strategy’, although the latter claim has been formulated more with respect to the 
internal structure regarding divisions and functional departments than with respect to 
governance structure. 
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